Collaborative Privacy Management by Pernul, Günther et al.
This article appeared in a journal published by Elsevier. The attached
copy is furnished to the author for internal non-commercial research
and education use, including for instruction at the authors institution
and sharing with colleagues.
Other uses, including reproduction and distribution, or selling or
licensing copies, or posting to personal, institutional or third party
websites are prohibited.
In most cases authors are permitted to post their version of the
article (e.g. in Word or Tex form) to their personal website or
institutional repository. Authors requiring further information
regarding Elsevier’s archiving and manuscript policies are
encouraged to visit:
http://www.elsevier.com/copyright
Author's personal copy
Collaborative privacy management
Jan Kolter a,*, Thomas Kernchen b, Gu¨nther Pernul a
aDepartment of Information Systems, University of Regensburg, D-93040 Regensburg, Germany
b Steria Mummert Consulting AG, Franzo¨sische Str. 48, D-10117 Berlin, Germany
a r t i c l e i n f o
Article history:
Received 22 September 2009
Received in revised form
9 December 2009
Accepted 10 December 2009
Keywords:
Privacy
Privacy infrastructure
Privacy-enhancing technologies
Collaboration
Usability
a b s t r a c t
The landscape of the World Wide Web with all its versatile services heavily relies on the
disclosure of private user information. Unfortunately, the growing amount of personal data
collected by service providers poses a significant privacy threat for Internet users. Tar-
geting growing privacy concerns of users, privacy-enhancing technologies emerged. One
goal of these technologies is the provision of tools that facilitate a more informative
decision about personal data disclosures. A famous PET representative is the PRIME project
that aims for a holistic privacy-enhancing identity management system. However,
approaches like the PRIME privacy architecture require service providers to change their
server infrastructure and add specific privacy-enhancing components. In the near future,
service providers are not expected to alter internal processes. Addressing the dependency
on service providers, this paper introduces a user-centric privacy architecture that enables
the provider-independent protection of personal data. A central component of the
proposed privacy infrastructure is an online privacy community, which facilitates the open
exchange of privacy-related information about service providers. We characterize the
benefits and the potentials of our proposed solution and evaluate a prototypical
implementation.
ª 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Today’s rich service offer in the WorldWideWeb increasingly
requires the disclosure of personal user data, which poses
a growing privacy threat to Internet users. Web site providers
utilize these personal data to create and analyze profiles or to
trigger personalized advertisements. At the worst, personal
information is released or sold to third parties.
Motivated by users who needed technical means to protect
their private data, privacy-enhancing technologies emerged
(Burkert, 1997; Goldberg and Wagner, 1997). A frequently dis-
cussed subject in this area is anonymity on network level. On
application level, privacy-enhancing technologies aim for
solutions that assist users in controlling and managing the
disclosure of personal data. Unfortunately, most approaches
rely on the cooperation of service providers who are required
to reveal their data handling practices truthfully.
The goal of this paper is the introduction of a collaborative
privacy community that facilitates a service provider-inde-
pendent privacy management. We propose a user-centric
privacy architecture and show the functions and the poten-
tials of an inherent collaborative privacy community. Finally,
we present a prototypical implementation of our solution.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. After
describing related work in Section 2, we present an overview
as well as the components of a user-centric privacy architec-
ture in Section 3. Section 4 introduces the content, functions
as well as the implementation and evaluation of our
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collaborative privacy community. Section 5 provides an
agenda for the launch of the proposed privacy community,
before the main contributions of this paper are highlighted in
Section 6.
2. Related work
The Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P) (Cranor et al.,
2006a) represents an early privacy-enhancing technology
framework aiming at aiding users in decisions regarding the
disclosure of their personal data. Offering an appropriate
policy language, P3P gives service providers the opportunity
to express their privacy policy in a machine-readable format.
When the user visits a Web site, a dedicated P3P privacy
agent matches the P3P privacy policy of the service provider
with pre-defined disclosure rules (so called privacy prefer-
ences) of the user. The matching process results in
a recommended disclosure behavior, which is signaled to
the user.
In addition to its frequently cited weaknesses (Electronic
Privacy Information Center, 2000; Hogben et al., 2002),
a crucial factor that prevents the widespread use of P3P is the
lagging adoption of P3P privacy policies, which are offered by
only a small fraction of service providers (Reay et al., 2007).
Aiming to support users’ ability to maintain their privacy,
the European PRIME project1 (Privacy and Identity Manage-
ment for Europe) developed a privacy-enhancing identity
management system, containing a privacy architecture with
different design guidelines, protocols and prototypical
scenarios (Leenes et al., 2008).
The PRIME architecture allows users to control the disclo-
sure and the usage of their personal data (Leenes et al., 2008;
Sommer et al., 2008). A significant element of the architecture
is the PRIME Toolbox, which needs to be installed both on the
client side and the provider side. The PRIME Toolbox incor-
porates all necessary components for privacy-enhancing
identity management and enables users to manage and use
multiple digital identities with varying personal data.
An additional element of the PRIME architecture is the
PRIME Middleware that integrates all PRIME components and
coordinates the communication between PRIME interaction
parties. The PRIME console serves as a graphical interface
enabling users to define privacy-related preferences that are
used to negotiate data handling practices with service
providers. Furthermore, an overview of already disclosed data
is provided. The architecture is capable of enforcing negoti-
ated policies, utilizing the installed PRIME components at the
service provider side.
In order to make use of the described PRIME functionality,
both users and service providers need to install the PRIME
Middleware and the PRIME Toolbox. From a user perspective
the attractiveness of PRIME rises, if the majority of service
providers adapt their service infrastructure. Hence, the
success of PRIME highly relies on the service providers’ will-
ingness to integrate the described PRIME components into
their applications.
3. User-centric privacy architecture
In the previous section we proved that existing privacy solu-
tions seeking to protect personal user data strongly rely on the
cooperation of service providers. This dependency, however,
is responsible for the low practical applicability of many
promising solutions. Even though threats of personal data
misuse are growing, the example of the P3P specification
shows that service providers do not contribute to the wide-
spread availability of accurate P3P policies voluntarily. Like-
wise, from today’s perspective it seems unlikely that service
providers will fundamentally change their internal back-end
infrastructures, as required for realizing the ideas of the
PRIME project.
Acknowledging the conflicting interests of service
providers as well as the need for usable tools, we introduce
a user-centric, service provider-independent privacy archi-
tecture (Kolter et al., 2009), which is depicted in Fig. 1. A
collaborative privacy community facilitates Internet users to
share privacy-related information about service providers.
The community is maintained by all participating members.
Three privacy components on the user side offer user-friendly
tools that assist users in controlling potential, actual and past
information flows, utilizing service provider information of
the privacy community.
Unlike provider-dependent privacy technologies our
proposed privacy architecture does not require the direct
support of service providers. We rather accept today’s service
landscape of the World Wide Web and offer a more practical
privacy infrastructure.
The user is supported by a browser plug-in, which serves as
user interface of the privacy architecture. The browser plug-in
displays privacy-related information and functions, which are
provided by three local privacy components. The Privacy
Preference Generator component assists users in controlling
potential information flows of personal data, while the Privacy
Agent component helps users check and control actual
information flows. Finally, the Data Disclosure Log provides
an overview of past personal information flows. All local
privacy components interact with the collaborative privacy
community.
In the following, we briefly specify the main purposes
and functions of the local privacy component, before the
collaborative privacy community is introduced in
Section 4.
3.1. Privacy preference generator
Enabling users to control potential personal data flows, the
proposed privacy architecture provides a Privacy Preference
Generator component that captures individual privacy pref-
erences. Privacy preferences define individual conditions of
personal data disclosures. As the Privacy Agent component
matches privacy preferences with a service provider’s privacy
policy, the resulting recommendation highly depends on the
accuracy of individual preferences.
Catering the needs of predominantly inexperienced users,
our solution offers a tool that allows users to define privacy
preferences in a user-understandable way (Kolter and Pernul,1 https://www.prime-project.eu/.
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2009). We facilitate the individual definition of privacy pref-
erences for pre-defined Internet service types, guaranteeing
more realistic and practical results. In addition to a user-
friendly configuration wizard, our solution provides a clear
configuration summary and evaluation.
3.2. Privacy agent
The Privacy Agent component assists users in making an
informed decision about the actual disclosure of personal
data.With regard to the visitedWeb site, this support involves
the presentation of relevant information of the privacy
community and the matching of a published P3P privacy
policy with user’s pre-defined privacy preferences. Returning
users benefit from information about linkable partial identi-
ties and already disclosed personal data.
3.3. Data disclosure log
The Data Disclosure Log component records personal data
transfers and provides a clear overview of past personal data
flows. Such an overview enables users to know the recipients
of past personal data transactions at any time (Pettersson
et al., 2006). This knowledge, for instance, represents
a prerequisite for an ex post revocation of personal data. The
Data Disclosure Log component requires both a tracking tool
thatmonitors personal data disclosures in theWeb browser as
well as usable interfaces that illustrate logged data trans-
actions in a comprehensible way. Ideally, the disclosure log
allows users to directly access, change or remove disclosed
personal data stored by a service provider.
4. Collaborative privacy community
The privacy community marks the central element of our
proposed privacy architecture and enables users to collabo-
ratively exchange privacy-relevant information, ratings and
experiences about service providers (Kolter et al., 2009). This
information includes, for instance, the required amount of
personal data for the fulfillment of a service and third parties
the provider shares personal user data with. A collaborative
privacy community represents a valuable data source for all
three local privacy components and facilitates a provider-
independent privacy protection.
All service provider information is maintained and orga-
nized in a Wiki-like Web front-end (Leuf and Cunningham,
2001). For each service provider privacy-related information is
grouped into an article, allowing all Internet users to view and
edit articles in theWeb browser. In addition, openWeb service
interfaces allow the flexible integration of privacy-related
serviceprovider information into the local privacy components.
4.1. Contents and functions
This section defines the provided content and functions of our
proposed privacy community. The selection was primarily
driven by the needs of the local privacy components, but also
by the potential of a provider-independent privacy
environment.
4.1.1. Static information about service providers
When an unknown Web site is visited, users generally have
the option to trust a service provider at face value or to look for
Fig. 1 – Collaborative, provider-independent privacy architecture.
c om p u t e r s & s e c u r i t y 2 9 ( 2 0 1 0 ) 5 8 0 – 5 9 1582
Author's personal copy
information about its reputation and data handling practices.
A survey shows that many users do not look up reputational
information, but rather judge service providers’ trustworthi-
ness by estimating theWeb site’s ‘‘Look and Feel’’, considering
questionable factors (Fogg et al., 2001). As collecting infor-
mation about a service provider is time-consuming, this
behavior of especially inexperienced users seems under-
standable. Addressing this fact, the privacy community
provides users with an easily available overview of static
service provider data.
This general information is primarily utilized by the local
Privacy Agent component and is displayed on demand,
enabling users to easily get a first impression of a service
provider.
In particular, the privacy community offers the following
static service provider information:
 The service provider’s URL
 The physical location of the server
 The offered service type
 Information about the revocation of already transferred
personal data
 Contact information
 A short textual description of the service provider
The URL is required to uniquely identify service providers.
The server location clarifies legal matters, as different privacy
laws apply in different countries. The service provider’s
service type is queried by the Privacy Agent component. This
capability facilitates the individual generation of privacy
preferences for each service type and their application during
policy matching.
In addition, the privacy community offers information (e.g.
a link or an e-mail address) about the removal of disclosed
personal data that have been transferred to a service provider.
This knowledge helps users exercise their rights to control
already transferred data and is utilized by the Data Disclosure
Log component. Exact contact information facilitates prose-
cution, if personal information is misused, or if users want to
enforce their rights to revoke their personal data. Further-
more, a short textual description specifies the main charac-
teristics of a service provider.
4.1.2. Required amount of personal data
In addition to static provider information the privacy
community enables users to know in advance what personal
data are requested by a certain service in theWorldWideWeb.
Users generally understand the necessity to disclose, for
example, name, address and payment information for
a product order at an online shop. If the service provider asks
for additional information, such as the marital status, the
date-of-birth or the annual salary, users tend to abort the
process, if they feel uncomfortable releasing these excessive
data. An online survey we conducted with 350 persons
revealed that 77% of all test persons cancel registration and
purchasing processes if too much personal information is
requested. Unfortunately, with today’s technical means users
are unable to determine in advance, what personal informa-
tion is necessary to use a specific service. In an effort to find
out, users have to start the process of filling a set of Web
forms. In many cases the most privacy-sensitive information
is requested on the last form page. If the user decides not to
proceed, he/she wasted valuable time and disclosed the
already transferred information with no use.
The introduced privacy community spares users from this
negative experience and enables them to exchange the amount
and type of personal data required for each process a service
provider offers. In this context, a process refers to each sepa-
rate service offer, such as Purchase or Newsletter Subscription. In
addition, the community stores the reliance of a process on the
completion of a different process. The process Purchase could,
for instance, require the completion of the process Registration.
In addition, the privacy community performs an automatic
evaluation of the required personal data with regard to the
offered process and service type, which further assists users in
assessing personal data requests of service providers. The
amount of required personal data as well as the results of the
automatic evaluation is employed and displayed to the user by
the local Privacy Agent component.
The amount of required personal data represents a funda-
mental element of privacy policies. Its online availability in
a privacy community facilitates the local Privacy Agent
component to retrieve this information and match it with
individual privacy preferences, if no sufficient machine-
readable privacy policy is offered by a service provider.
4.1.3. Third party recipients
The decision to disclose personal information to a service
provider not only relies on the amount of data, but also on the
service provider’s data handling practices. Here, the for-
warding of user data to third parties is a considerably privacy-
sensitive factor.
While the P3P specification only defines third party cate-
gories, the proposed privacy community allows the exchange
of individual third parties the service provider shares personal
data with. These parties can include affiliated companies and
other business partnerships. This information is displayed to
the user by the local Privacy Agent component on demand.
Again, information about third party releases can be utilized
to replace a machine-readable privacy policy of the service
provider.
4.1.4. Collecting and explaining privacy policies
In general, a service provider’s textual privacy policy is the
only available information source about its data handling
practices. Studies show, however, that privacy policies are not
regarded as understandable and are read by only a small
fraction of Internet users (Jensen et al., 2005; Pollach, 2007).
Addressing the needs of the majority of Internet users, the
privacy community allows experienced users to write and
share an understandable explanation of a provider’s privacy
policy. As privacy experts comprehend all aspects of a policy,
they have the ability to paraphrase important elements in
a form that – compared to a published policy as well as
automatic privacy policy summaries (Arshad, 2004; Cranor
et al., 2006b) – is easy to understand.
Furthermore, as privacy policies change over time, the
privacy community maintains a history of privacy policies,
containing both textual policies as well as machine-readable
P3P policies. Such a policy history enables users to determine
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the policy that has been valid, when personal data have been
disclosed. The privacy community also allows users to rate
current and past privacy policies of service providers with
regard to the stated data handling practices.
4.1.5. Adherence to privacy policies
As the presence of a privacy-friendly privacy policy is no
guarantee that a service provider follows that expressed policy,
the presented privacy community enables users to rate the
policy adherence of service providers. Based on their individual
experiences users evaluate, whether or not a service provider
processes personal data as stated in the privacy policy. For
example, if not expressed in the privacy policy, a received e-
mail that promotes a product would justify a negative policy
adherence rating of that service provider. Displayed by the local
Privacy Agent component, this information is of considerable
importance for a disclosure decision.
4.1.6. Individual experiences
Finally, the offered service provider information is com-
plemented by individual user experiences. These open post-
ings can contain any privacy-related positive or negative
experiences and are not related to a specific aspect of the
provider’s data handling practices.
Integrated into the Privacy Agent component, the indi-
vidual experiences are utilized for the presentation of repu-
tational information about a service provider.
4.1.7. Sharing privacy preferences with connected users
In Section 3.1 we pointed out the purpose and usage of indi-
vidual privacy preferences. The Privacy Preference Generator
component allows the definition of these disclosure rules,
which are in turn used by the Privacy Agent component to
calculate disclosure recommendations. The quality of these
recommendations strongly relies on the accuracy of privacy
preferences. Even though the Privacy Preference Generator
component should alleviate this challenge by offering a usable
and understandable user interface, building accurate privacy
preferences is a critical task. This especially applies to inex-
perienced users, as they are not familiarwith service providers’
data handling practices and the used privacy-related language.
For this reason, the privacy community facilitates the
exchange of privacy preferences among users. Using an inte-
grated social networking component (Boyd et al., 2007), users
have the option to upload privacy preferences and share them
with selected members.
Imported privacy preferences of a trusted privacy expert or
organization represent valuable assistance for inexperienced
users, resulting in improved disclosure recommendations of
the local Privacy Agent component.
4.2. User management
The internal user management of the privacy community
administers three user roles. Offering an open information
source, the basic user role is assigned to every unregistered
user and grants access to all available information about
service providers. Furthermore, it permits users to edit articles
collaboratively and to create new service provider articles. In
order to prevent vandalism, the privacy community provides
adequate backup and versioning functionality.
If users want to directly exchange information with con-
nected members, a simple registration is necessary. Regis-
tration only requires a username and a password. The
community does not request any additional personal user
information. Unlike basic users, registered users have the
option to upload and share generated privacy preferences
with connected members. Likewise, privacy preferences of
connected members can be downloaded and imported into
the Privacy Preference Generator. We point out that the
involved social networking component does not have the
purpose of maintaining social contacts, but only to exchange
privacy experiences and privacy preferences. Users can self-
assess their level of knowledge and experience, helping
inexperienced users to estimate the quality of advises and
preferences.
Finally, users holding the administrator role specify avail-
able processes as well as the appropriate amount of personal
data for each process. If necessary, administrators are able to
block users.
4.3. Prototype
We implemented a prototype of our proposed privacy
community. In the following, we present the prototype’s
system architecture, the used frameworks as well as the
graphical user interface.
4.3.1. System architecture
Asmentioned earlier, theWeb front-end and the local privacy
components on the user side simultaneously access the
community. The integration of heterogeneous client applica-
tions requires the specification of standardized interfaces,
which is ideally realized by a Service-oriented Architecture
(SOA) (MacKenzie et al., 2006). Implementing the concept of
a SOA, the privacy community encapsulates the offered
information pieces and actions into fine-grained Web
services. Each Web service provides a machine-readable
WSDL (Chinnici et al., 2007b,a) service definition, which
clearly defines its interface. The communication of the
privacy community with its clients via SOAP messages
(Gudgin et al., 2007a,b) guarantees a consistent data exchange
format. Fig. 2 shows the privacy community’s interactionwith
the components of the privacy architecture.
For the community’s Web front-end we utilize an Ajax
(Garrett, 2005) Web architecture, allowing asynchronous,
interactive communications between the Web front-end and
the community server. The Ajax engine transforms JavaScript
(Flanagan, 2006) requests of the user into SOAP requests,
which are forwarded to the community back-end on the
server side. A Web service server receives and processes
requests querying the provider database, before requested
data are sent back to the client via SOAP. The Ajax engine of
theWeb front-end transforms these SOAPmessages to a user-
friendly GUI using HTML (Raggett et al., 1999) and CSS (Bos
et al., 2009).
The local privacy components – the Privacy Preference
Generator (PPG), the Privacy Agent (PA) and the Data
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Disclosure Log (DDL) components – directly access the Web
service server via SOAP messages.
4.3.2. Implementation details
The back-end of the privacy community employs NuSOAP,2
a PHP-based SOAP toolkit that provides the required service
functionality for our proposed privacy infrastructure. The
Web service interface definitions can be accessed following
this link.3
The SOAP server accesses aMySQL database,4 which stores
all service provider information as well as the presented data
type and service type vocabularies.
For the Web front-end we utilize the Web application
framework CodeIgniter.5 The PHP-based framework facili-
tates the MVC-compliant development of dynamic Web
applications and allows for the smooth integration of the
back-end Web services. On the client side, the JavaScript
framework jQuery6 offers AJAX and dynamic HTML tech-
nologies, which provide necessary drag & drop and auto-
complete functions, overlays, as well as high performance
DOM parsing.
4.3.3. Graphical user interface
The designedWeb front-end aims for a clear layout and a high
degree of user-friendliness. With regard to the assigned role
users are able to look up, view and edit service provider arti-
cles, register, login and share privacy preferences with
selected members, and administer users and structural data
of the community. In the following, we focus on the design of
the service provider catalog and a service provider article. For
a complete review of the graphical user interface, the inter-
ested reader is referred to the prototypical implementation of
the privacy community, which is accessible at the following
link.7
The welcome page shortly explains the purpose and the
content of the privacy community and its related local privacy
components. From this starting page, the user has the option
to enter the catalog page, which lists all service providers
maintained in the privacy community (see Fig. 3). Service
providers are represented by tiles that contain a large provider
logo, contributing to an easy association of the underlying
article. In addition to the provider logo, a calculated average
privacy rating is shown at the bottom of each tile. The rating is
presented as star rating whose interpretation and usage is
familiar tomost users. Selections at the left side allow users to
filter service providers based on their service type and their
average privacy rating. Alternatively, users can type a service
provider name in the search field at the top right of the page.
Here, an auto-complete function eases the correct article
selection. A third page provides a detailed presentation of the
local privacy components and offers the download of an
installer.
If a service provider is not listed in the privacy community,
users can create a new service provider article at any time.
The optional registration and login functionality is offered at
the header of each page.
The privacy-related content of service provider articles is
divided into five tabs. In the following, we present the
community article of the eCommerce provider Amazon.8
The initial tab offers a quick overview of the service
provider (see Fig. 4), including the service provider’s name, its
average rating, a dynamically generated screenshot of its
current Web site as well as privacy contact information. In
addition, a general textual description of the service provider
is presented. Moving the mouse over the average rating in the
tab header triggers an overlay that lists the individual star
ratings of each subcategory. At the bottom of the page three
Fig. 2 – Interaction of the privacy community.
2 http://sourceforge.net/projects/nusoap/.
3 http://www-ifs.uni-regensburg.de/Privacy/soap_ws/.
4 http://www.mysql.com/.
5 http://codeigniter.com/.
6 http://jquery.com/.
7 http://www-ifs.uni-regensburg.de/Privacy/.
8 http://www.amazon.com/.
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lists contain the most recently visited service providers,
randomly selected service providers of the same service type
and service providers with the most similar average privacy
ratings. These article links allow for a quick comparison of
similar service providers, facilitating an effective evaluation of
service providers’ privacy practices. The tab header and the
three lists at the bottom of the page are presented in all
remaining article tabs.
The second tab shows the required amount of personal
data for all offered processes, which are represented by green
arrows (see Fig. 5). If the user clicks an arrow, a text box
unfolds containing the required personal data elements. In
our example, the process Purchase is selected, which requires
an Address, a Phone Number, Payment Information and an E-mail
Address. The arrangement of the process arrows indicates that
the Purchase process requires the completion of the Registra-
tion process that may require additional personal data. Based
on comparable Purchase processes, the community evaluates
the amount of required personal data as negative.
Concentrating on the data handling practices of the
service provider, the fourth tab lists a privacy policy history –
including the currently valid policy – along with a star rating
of each policy (see Fig. 6). The history is capable of storing
textual and P3P versions of privacy policies. Below the list of
privacy policies, a short explanation of the effective privacy
policy is offered to inexperienced users. At the bottom of the
tab, users can rate the policy adherence of the service
provider. Upcoming releases of the privacy community will
offer multilangual storage of policy explanations, enabling
a broader group of users to benefit from that provided
information.
Focusing on personal data sharing, the fourth tab employs
a directed graph to visualize third parties the service provider
shares personal user data with (see Fig. 7). Originating from
the examined service provider, arrows point to additional data
recipients, which are represented by white boxes that contain
their names and Favicons. If the user clicks a data recipient,
the article of the respective provider is loaded.
Finally, a fifth tab lists posted user comments about
privacy-related experiences with the service provider.
Edit buttons in the tabheaders facilitate theadditionand the
revision of the collaboratively maintained information. If
Fig. 3 – Service provider catalog.
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clicked, overlays capture the revised user input, using text
boxes and drag and drop selections. Also placed in the tab
header,aVersionsbuttonallows therecoveryofolder revisions.
4.4. Evaluation
In order to evaluate the design and the structure of the
community Web front-end, we conducted a user test that
assessed usability, user acceptance and the potential user
participation of the collaborative privacy community.
For the user experiment we recruited 26 test persons,
acknowledging frequent recommendations that a single-digit
sample is insufficient for a user test (Faulkner, 2003; Perfetti
and Landesmann, 2001; Spool and Schroeder, 2001). Aiming at
a heterogeneous test sample, the invited test persons showed
a diverse academic and professional background. However,
basic knowledge of Microsoft Windows as well as the occa-
sional use of the World Wide Web were prerequisites for
participating candidates. In order to avoid biased results,
persons with close relationships to the interviewers were not
considered.
In particular, the test sample included 17 university
students, while nine test persons were graduated profes-
sionals. Hence, 15 out of the 26 test persons were 25 years old
or younger, seven between 26 and 30, and four between 30 and
45. 22 of all test personsweremale. Out of the 17 students nine
were enrolled in a technical program and five in a business
program. From the remaining students two were pursuing
a teaching degree and one a diploma in mathematics.
In order to measure the unbiased understandability of the
page layout, test persons were only informed about the
general purpose of the community. No detailed explanation of
the Web page was provided. Before the first assignment, test
persons had the opportunity to get familiar with the structure
and the tabs of the Web page.
The first task targeted the submission of a provided privacy
posting about the eCommerce shop Tchibo.9 This task
required the search for the proper service provider in the
community using the offered navigation elements. Doing that,
more than half of the test persons used the search field, which
Fig. 4 – Article – static provider information.
9 http://www.tchibo.com.
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is placed in the page header, while the remaining test persons
clicked on the index tab, an early version of the catalog page,
which presented a textual listing of all available service
providers. The outcome and the user feedback led us to offer
a more meaningful catalog page, which contributes to more
intuitive page navigation. Nevertheless, the test results
underscored the necessity of offering both a service provider
catalog and a search field. Once the proper article was loaded,
all test persons clicked the correct tab and posted a comment
with no difficulties.
Within the following task, we asked test persons to post
a particular rating for the policy adherence of the same service
provider. Again, most test persons found the relevant tab and
succeeded smoothly. Four out of 26 test persons, however,
were not familiar with the handling of star ratings and needed
guidance of the interviewers. Being asked after the completion
of the task, 17 test persons were able to explain the difference
between the ranking of the privacy policy itself and the policy
adherence ranking, while nine persons could not differentiate
both ratings. This fact highlighted the need of explaining labels,
which were added in the latest revision of the community.
Subsequently, test persons were asked to publish a set of
data types required by a Purchase process at Tchibo. Only nine
test persons solved that task problem-free. The majority of
test persons did not intuitively find the position of the Edit and
Save buttons, which led us to reallocate their positions.
In the interview section 22 out of 26 test persons agreed
that the information of a service provider article was struc-
tured and designed in an understandable way. 24 out of 26 test
personswould consult and use the privacy community in real-
life scenarios. Being asked about the reliance of the commu-
nity data, 18 test persons stated they would trust the privacy
community, once the community gained enough members.
The remaining eight test persons voiced their concern about
the openness of the community, which – in theory – allows
service providers to manipulate community data to their
favor. One of these test persons admitted that a rising level of
popularity and submitted data would alleviate that threat, as
proven by well-known open reviewing systems of Ebay and
Amazon.
17 test persons agreed that they would actively participate
in editing articles of the privacy community. The remaining
nine test persons would not add or change community data,
hinting at their general reluctance to post content in public
forums and other open content management systems.
A few test persons suggested the incorporation of other
non-privacy-related information like delivery time or ship-
ping costs. In our opinion, however, these data would
contradict to the goals of the privacy community and would
not contribute to its reputation of a provider-independent
information source.
Finally, the user test revealed that 15 out of 26 test persons
would upload and share their individual privacy preferences
with selected users of the privacy community.
5. Agenda
This section outlines criteria for the successful launch as well
as the long-term financing of an online privacy community.
As mentioned earlier, the idea of a collaborative privacy
community is primarily based on the successful Wikipedia
concept (Leuf and Cunningham, 2001). Consequently, the
launch of a privacy community can be related to success
factors for the launch of a general ‘‘Wiki’’.
In order to achieve the critical number of participating
users, the successful launch of a privacy community requires
the full exploitation of the Wiki effect. The Wiki effect is
defined as a large number of Internet users visiting a Web site
on a regular basis and voluntarily contributing to the struc-
ture, shape and quality of its content (Ebersbach and Glaser,
2007). In order to benefit from the Wiki effect, Davies (2004)
recommends selectively seeding initial content that intro-
duces the Wiki’s goal to new participants. The character of
this initial content should not be final or complete, as this
could prevent users from editing that content.
Hence, before the launch of a privacy community, articles
of the best-known service providers should be created and
filled with sparse information. In particular, we recommend
entering the offered service type, the amount of required
personal data and the release of personal data to third parties,
as this information represents essential input for the local
privacy components.
Addressing the promotion of a privacy community,
comments in public forums and other public communication
channels contribute to aWiki’s level of popularity (Parry, 2006).
In addition, a press release is recommended, which should be
forwarded to authors of blogs and other topic-related Web
sites. Furthermore, the creation of a clear tutorial is suggested
that outlines the community’s main goals and functionality. A
Fig. 5 – Article – required amount of personal data.
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tutorial enables new users to gain a quick overview and
increases the chances that users contribute actively.
Finally, crucial success factors of the privacy community
are security and trust considerations. In theory, the offered
platform is capable of tracking the information requests of
users. As local privacy components query data from the
privacy community on a regular basis, amalicious community
provider could create andmisuse detailed navigation logs. Our
proposed privacy community acknowledges this potential
privacy threat and allows the anonymous accessing and
editing of all collaboratively maintained data. When users
have built the necessary level of trust in the community, they
can opt to register, which allows them to connect to friends
and to exchange experiences and privacy preferences.
In addition, an attacker could place untruthful information
in articles of the privacy community. Addressing this threat,
we store the IP address of anonymous postings, which
complicates efforts to influence articles. As mentioned in the
previous section, a growing number of submitted data for
a service provider will further lower the chance of manipu-
lation. As proven in large collaborative platforms, the
prevention of misuse will additionally rely on administrators
and vigilant users.
After a successful launch and a risen number of users the
long-term maintenance of a privacy community inevitably
involves expenses, e.g. for the operation of the server infra-
structure and, possibly, the entailing maintenance personnel.
In the context of Web 2.0 applications, Alby (2007) discusses
the potentials of both advertising and a fee-based member-
ship. These sources of financing can also be applied to the
maintenance of a privacy community.
Technically there are multiple ways to place advertise-
ments into a privacy community. Considering our proposed
solution, advertisement should not be used at the expense of
usability and should not affect the clear structure of an article.
For the same reason, intrusive advertisements like pop-up
windows should be avoided. While dynamic advertisement
applications such as Google AdSense provide attractive
models for the generation of revenues, we do not recommend
the integration of contextual advertisements into a privacy
community, as this could result in the placement of a service
provider’s ad banner in the community article of that
provider. Such a behavior does not underscore provider-
independence and could weaken users’ trust in the privacy
community.
A fee-based membership represents a further business
model for a privacy community. If this financing source is
chosen, the privacy community should provide a basic service
offer for free. Special, value-added functions could require
a membership involving monthly or annual fees. Specifically,
Fig. 6 – Article – privacy policy summary.
Fig. 7 – Article – third party recipients.
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the social networking component that facilitates the direct
exchange of privacy preferences and experiences could be
defined as a premium function only available for paying
members. Premium functions could also involve functionality
and certain features of the local privacy components.
Finally, a privacy community could raise donations to
cover operating costs, highlighting its service provider-
independence. This option would, however, require the
abandonment of advertisement. The prominent example of
Wikipedia shows that donations can cover operating costs of
a large community. Donations are made by satisfied users
who are convinced of Wikipedia’s goal that knowledge should
be accessible to anyone.
The goal of the introduced privacy community is the
provider-independent enhancement of privacy. If the
increased level of privacy and the improved privacy aware-
ness of both users and providers are recognized, the privacy
community could equally convince users of its higher goals
and motivate to make donations.
6. Conclusions
Addressing the need for practical technologies that protect
personal data disclosures in the World Wide Web, this paper
introduces a user-centric privacy architecture that does not
depend on the cooperation of service providers. Marking the
central element of the underlying privacy architecture, we
present a usable privacy community, which facilitates the
collaborative exchange of privacy-relevant information and
ratings about service providers. Moreover, our developed
solution allows users to know in advance, what personal data
are required for a specific service. Benefitting from the knowl-
edge of experienced users, the privacy community enables
average Internet users tomake amore informed decision about
the disclosure and management of personal data.
Provider-independence as well as the collaborative char-
acter will help foster the usage and acceptance of privacy-
enhancing technologies.
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